ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
The United Nations today occupies a political space at the centre of the global dialogue. 2 To most of the world, the United Nations symbolises much of the hope for international peace and security through global cooperation, dialogue, collective responses to security threats and, perhaps predominantly, through human rights. What to make of the fact that Jan Smuts . . . helped draft the UN"s stirring preamble? How could the new world body"s commitment to human rights owe more than a little to the participation of a man whose segregationist policies back home paved the way for the apartheid state?
However, as Mark Mazower illustrates in No Enchanted
The central aim of Mazower"s chapter on Smuts is to lay bare Smuts" Janus face: the dichotomy of how Smuts could promote a colonial system and advocate segregationist policies in South Africa and be chiefly responsible for the the drafting of the Charter"s lofty preamble, through which the world expressed its determination to "reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights [and] in the dignity and worth of the human person." 5 The purpose of this article is to gain a better understanding of what Smuts might have meant when he introduced the phrase "human rights" into the Preamble of the Charter of the United Nations.
THE HUMAN RIGHTS IDIOM DURING THE EARLY 1940s: 'AN EMPTY VESSEL?'
Today we live in what Louis Henkin has called an age of rights. 6 Human rights have been described as a "global religion" 7 and "the lingua franca of modern political discourse." 8 In perhaps no other facet of its work has the United Nations been so prolific or, some would argue, so successful as it has been in the adoption of new international norms for the protection of human rights.
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It would be incorrect to state that "human rights" was a new term born of the Second World War. 10 As a figure of speech it did, however, enter the lexicon of educated readers and influential commentators in the World War II era. 10 It is true that the phrase "human rights" has an extensive history. It was first used by Thomas Paine in 1791 in The Rights of Man, in which he translated the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, adopted by the French National Assembly on 27 August 1789. Paine wrote: "The representatives of the people of France, formed into a National Assembly, considering that ignorance, neglect, or contempt of human rights, are the sole cause of public misfortunes and corruptions of Government, have resolved to set forth in a solemn declaration, these natural, imperceptible, and inalienable rights . . ." Simpson (note 6 above) 9. Although the phrase was used intermittently in the 19th and early 20th centuries, before the Second World War it was by no means in common use. 12 When Roosevelt addressed the United States Congress on 6 January 1941, almost a year before declaring war on Japan, he concluded his State of the Union message with his famous peroration on the into the war, and the publication of the United Nations Declaration, 14 "combined to generate widespread interest in human rights and their protection." 15 However, to determine what specifically was meant by this phrase "human rights"
being bandied about during the Second World War is problematic. 16 That is because the Four Freedoms. He proclaimed that he sought to secure "four essential freedoms" for all: freedom of speech and expression, freedom of worship, freedom from want, and freedom from fear -everywhere in the world. Significantly, in the speech Roosevelt employed the phrase "human rights," thereby facilitating the popularisation of its use: "The nation has placed its destiny in the hands and heads of its millions of free men and women; and its faith in freedom under the guidance of God. Freedom means the supremacy of human rights everywhere. Our support goes to those who struggle to gain those rights or to keep them." President"s Message to Congress, 87 Congressional Record (daily ed 6 January 1941) 44, 46 -47 as quoted in Borgwardt (note 11 above) 516 -17 (my emphasis). 13 On 9 August 1941 Roosevelt and Churchill met for three and a half days under conditions of strictest secrecy and under heavy naval protection at Placentia Bay, off the coast of Newfoundland. The document that resulted from this series of meetings was issued via telegram to the world on 14 August 1941, and became known as the "Atlantic Charter." Eight points came to be articulated in the Charter. In the name of "their hopes for a better future for the world," the Anglo-American leaders publicly announced that they sought no territorial aggrandisement for themselves; supported freedom of trade and of the seas; and respected "the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live." In addition, they aspired to ensure "improved labor standards, economic advancement, and social security" in all nations; desired people everywhere to be able to have the right to "live out their lives in freedom from want and fear;" and sought to establish a "wider and permanent system of general security" for the world. 14 With the United States once again taking the lead, the Declaration of the United Nations resulted from the second Churchill-Roosevelt summit, held four months after the Atlantic Conference in December 1941 and January 1942. This was a joint declaration, signed on 1 January 1942, by 26 nations in the anti-Axis coalition, in which they subscribed to the purposes and principles of the Atlantic Charter, and committed their full resources, military and economic, to winning the war against the Axis Powers. Each government also pledged itself to cooperate with the other signatory governments, and not to enter into a separate peace. Twenty six additional countries subsequently adhered to the Declaration. It was in the preamble to this Declaration that "human rights" eo nomine first appeared: "Being convinced that complete victory over their enemies is essential to defend life, liberty, independence and religious freedom, and to preserve human rights and justice in their own lands as well as in other lands and that they are now engaged in a common struggle against savage and brutal forces seeking to subjugate the world." "Joint Declaration by United Nations" (1 January 1942) US Department of State Bulletin (3 January 1942) 3 as reprinted in Von Mangoldt & Rittberger (eds) (note 13 above) Document 2 (my emphasis). 15 Simpson (note 6 above) 185. 16 The question about the meaning of the term "human rights" in the early 1940s is situated within a larger topical debate about the birth of the international human rights movement. There has in recent years developed an influential new school of revisionist history, exemplified by the work of Samuel Moyn, which locates the origins of the international human rights movement in the 1970s, because it was only then that "they were widely understood as a moral alternative to bankrupt political utopias," such as socialism, nationalism, and communism. S Moyn The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (2012) 227. The revisionists have come under scrutiny from among others, Philip Alston, who rejects the "big bang" theory of human rights. Alston argues that the history of human rights is both long and deep, which is not to say that its progress has been linear, steady, or even predictable. Alston states: "Any meaningful history of human rights must disaggregate and address separately the different analytical dimensions of the overall enterprise. The enterprise of "human rights" consists of too many distinct facets to be reduced to one or two variables. The history and power of ideas, the force of grassroots social and political movements, the impact of legal and constitutional traditions, and the influence of institutions at both the domestic and international levels constitute indispensable elements that need to be factored into any effort to understand the origins, nature, and potential significance of the present regime. 20 The United States, closely followed by Great Britain, realised the value of the ideological power of "human rights" to mobilise support for the war effort.
21
Samuel Moyn argues that the phrase "human rights" made its "fateful entry" as mere rhetorical adornment -as a "politically inspiring phrase," as a "war slogan" to justify why the Allies had to be "now engaged in a common struggle against savage and brutal forces seeking to subjugate the world. At the Atlantic meeting, we had in mind, primarily, the restoration of the sovereignty, self-government and national life of the States and nations of Europe now under the Nazi yoke . . . So that is quite a separate problem from the progressive evolution of self-governing institutions in the regions whose peoples owe allegiance to the British Crown.
Despite Churchill"s protestations, the Atlantic Charter "quickly took on a life of its own, unanticipated by those who drafted it." 32 It soon became celebrated for a resounding phrase that seemingly described the essential character of the post-war world it 27 Simpson (note 16 above) 160. an "ephemeral press release intended for European ears only," whereas Mandela"s Atlantic
Charter was a "manifesto of individual dignity." Lest there be any misunderstanding of the crusade at hand, Roosevelt declared that this was nothing short of a global struggle against "tyranny and cruelty and serfdom" in which there could never be a compromise "between good and evil," and where "only total victory" could bring about the realisation of human rights. 42 The text of the United Nations
Declaration expressed the conception that savagery and lack of respect for human rights are inextricably linked. This led to general acceptance that the notions of human rights and "civilisation" go hand-in-hand. 43 It was in this context that Smuts gave expression to the phrase "basic human rights" in his initial draft of the Preamble to the Charter.
'RIGHTS,' 'DUTIES' AND 'CIVILISATION'
In order to fully appreciate Smuts" inchoate understanding of the concept of "human rights,"
it is necessary to briefly explore Smuts" conceptions of "rights," "duties" and "civilisation."
Saul Dubow points out that, in Smuts" original draft of the Preamble that he presented at the British Commonwealth Meeting in April of 1945, he espoused "basic"
rather than "fundamental" human rights. 44 It would appear that in Smuts" view there was a significant difference. 45 Dubow argues that, in Smuts" mind, human rights concerned basic or minimal needs like security and life, and that they pertained to matters such as freedom 40 of expression or religion. But, human rights were not synonymous with equality -whether of a political, social or racial variety. 46 As part of its submissions in defence against the attack of India at the first meeting of the General Assembly in 1946, the South African delegation explicitly argued that human rights had never been internationally agreed-upon. The Charter itself did not define such rights, and only spoke of promoting them. 47 Smuts was adamant that political rights were also not fundamental. 48 It was also inconceivable to Smuts that the framers of the Charter could ever have intended to elevate political equality to the status of a fundamental human right. 49 "Such an argument was tantamount to saying that the more progressive races should be retarded by the less progressive, if, in fact they constituted a majority." Indeed, the "great historic codes of our human advance" emphasised duties, and not rights. highest, noblest code of man," the Sermon on the Mount of Christ -"all are silent on rights, all lay stress on duties." 54 Smuts believed that "rights" are:
55
[M]uch too individualistic and give no due recognition to that organic human and social unity which the duties of the older codes recognized as the real rule and law and pattern of right living. 56 Smuts continued: 57 I should think the preamble to the Charter fairly expresses the fundamental objective of our advancing human society in their most general form. If we have to be more specific we would stress justice, the rule of law, and the like.
Smuts" expressions on "rights" elucidate the fact that Smuts was by no means an "individualist." His most enduring legacy is, after all, as an "internationalist;" as the "visionary, globe-trotting statesman-philosopher, committed to his evolutionist paradigm of cosmic harmony under beneficent white guidance." 58 The thrust of Smuts" ideas, words
and actions was to secure the freedom of the world from Bolshevism, Fascism, and later Communism; he was never much concerned with individual rights or individual freedom.
For Smuts always the spread of western civilisation was the driving logic or spirit; 59 the notion of civilisation was at the core of his thought. 60 Smuts was a figure of empire -of the British Empire at the very height of its power. He was born on Queen Victoria"s fiftyfirst birthday, as a British subject. He was fully intellectually formed during his student days at Cambridge of the early 1890s. This was a time when Western civilisation was held by many to be the highest ideal, and the spread of Western civilisation deemed a sacred 54 Ibid. 55 56 Smuts would in all likelihood have agreed with his one-time adversary, Gandhi, in this regard. Cmiel notes that many works on human rights in the twenty-first century invoke Mohandas Gandhi as a friend of human rights. In truth, Gandhi disliked "rights-talk" of any kind, associating it with the self-indulgence of the modern age. He was inclined to phrase his rhetoric in terms of "duties," instead of "rights," and generally kept his distance from the human rights campaigns of the 1940s. duty; when "advanced people had the responsibility to look after the more backward." 61 Smuts carried the torch of the Enlightenment:
62
The human spirit having once broken its primeval shackles and emerged from its bondage will never agin submit to them for good. Evolution never reverts back to discarded forms or organs. And the light that has dawned on our human horizon can never permanently set again . . . There may be a temporary eclipse, but never again can there be a return for good to the dark ages of the human spirit.
Time has one direction and never moves back.
HUMAN RIGHTS AS AN IDEOLOGICAL RESPONSE TO WAR
One has to bear in mind that by the time Smuts used the phrase "human rights," he had been integrally involved in, and had helped to end, three of the most devastating military This war has not been an ordinary war of the old type. It has been a war of ideologies, of conflicting philosophies of life and conflicting faiths. In the deepest sense it has been a war of religion perhaps more so than any other war of history . . . [T]his was not a mere brute struggle of force between the nations but for us, behind the mortal struggle, was the moral struggle, the vision of the ideal . . .
The Nazi threat had touched the "bedrock of human advance," and "something very deep and far-reaching" indeed would have to be attempted to deal with the "evils now emerging on our path." 70 There is some controversy in the scholarly literature over whether the renewed focus on human rights at San Francisco could be explained as a reaction to the atrocities of the Second World War. 71 JH Burgers does not doubt that there is some connection between the horrors perpetrated by the Nazis during the war and the renewed emphasis on human rights at this time but, this could be only a partial explanation. Burgers concludes that all the decisive steps toward strengthening the Charter provisions with regard to human rights were taken before the capitulation of the German forces. 72 81 Ibid.
The conference was convened as an act of faith in the future and of remorse for the past even as the allied armies were driving through a bleeding and prostrate Germany to their fateful meeting in the heart of Europe.
In Smuts was repulsed by Hitler"s crudity and the vulgarity of the Nazis. 84 He described In that fundamental sense we continue on the historic trail of human progress.
There can be no doubt that Smuts was fully aware of the consequences of the Nazi It is clear that for Smuts, the Nazi challenge to human dignity had brought the question of human rights down from the plane of philosophical speculation to that of life and death -life in freedom, or death in gas chambers. 98 Smuts stated that it was in the context of these crimes that he wanted the United Nations, to "re-establish faith in fundamental human rights." 99 The second paragraph of his draft Preamble containing this phrase had to be read in conjunction with the preceding 101 Friedmann also includes the totalitarian regimes of the Soviet Union and its satellites, as well as India with its one hundred million "untouchables" under the caste system, but these member states were even more reluctant to openly admit potential "human rights" violations in their domestic spheres. These were also the states which would lead the hue and cry again South Africa at the first meeting of the General Assembly the following year. Friedmann comments as follows:
By the time the amended preamble emerged after a series of debates behind closed doors, all
delegations knew that what General Smuts was aiming at was the prevention of a repetition of wholesale atrocities, such as the systematic extermination of peoples, to sustain undemocratic political systems.
Thus, it would seem that the context in which Smuts gave expression to the phrase "basic human rights" in his initial draft of the Preamble to the Charter, was the same as Churchill"s intended context with the Atlantic Charter -i.e., applying "to states and nations . . . under the Nazi yoke." Smuts used the phrase "fundamental human rights" to symbolise those fundamental freedoms that set the Allies apart from Hitler"s new order.
Thus, a fair conclusion seems to be that Smuts saw the concept of "fundamental human rights" as short-hand for those values, the violation of which had led to the wars in which he had witnessed such carnage and devastation. He had experienced wholesale slaughter between (predominantly European) states engaged in international armed conflict. That is what Smuts set himself to put an end to. It is clear that Smuts" primary concern was not the maltreatment perpetrated by governments against their own populations, but against the populations of other states. Such a view was in accordance with the prevailing idea of his time that only states could be subjects, and thus holders of rights, under international law, and that only states were therefore entitled to the protection of the international community. 
CONCLUSION
The concept of human rights as we know it today has developed much farther than Smuts"
rudimentary and limited understanding of that notion. Smuts viewed the ideological commitment to "human rights" first and foremost as a method "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war" -to prevent at all costs, a third world war that humanity, let alone Western Christian civilisation, could not survive. However, human rights were emphatically not synonymous with political, social or racial equality. Smuts can thus hardly be seen as a proponent of the modern understanding of human rights.
In advancing human rights, Smuts" point of reference were the conflicts in which he fought, which were directed against international aggression, and which originated as European conflicts. The struggle for racial equality on the domestic front in South Africa was still in its infancy during his lifetime. His great failure -made all the more apparent by his expansive vision in matters of international relations -was the fact that he did not see what is so obvious today, namely that the same underlying issues were at stake both internationally and domestically.
Schwarz formulates the essential point thus: 106 [W]e . . . have to remember how difficult it is to deal with such issues without the condescension of posterity, whatever its enormity. Positions which to us look bizarrely self-contradictory can be experienced in their own historical time as banal in their obviousness. So it was . . . with Smuts.
Moreover, advances in the human rights project are almost always -as a matter of course and not exception -accompanied by a measure of duality. In addition to Smuts" duality, the differing interpretations of the Atlantic Charter by its principal drafters, Roosevelt and
Churchill, also illustrates this principle. Such duality arises inevitably from the nature of human rights advances.
Seminal human rights developments come about, not as the coherent manifestations of self-executing principles, but, rather, as the contingent and circumscribed responses by individuals to specific problems that they face. Human rights specifically, just as international law more generally, largely has a retroactive nature. 107 This is simply a consequence of human agency, and what Christof Heyns has termed the "struggle approach" to human rights. 108 The example of Smuts illustrates this as well as any other.
The fact that human rights evolve through struggle mean that they will, by necessity, be incomplete at any given time. Because change is fundamental to evolution, contradiction is possible -indeed inevitable. The advance of human rights has often depended on the exposure of dualism of this kind. However, the alternative to expressing a commitment to an unattainable ideal is a sterile acceptance of what seems to be the confines of the current reality. Ralph Barton Perry, professor of philosophy at Harvard despised. They should be enthusiastically applauded for the good that they promise, rather than condemned in the name of the perfection they do not reach . . . Those who refuse to take a step towards their goal because it does not at once reach the goal are likely to stand still or move backward.
Smuts knew better than most that both the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Charter of the United Nations were drawn up in sharp and immediate revulsion for war. 110 In neither case was the mood one appropriate to profound enquiry or dispassionate deliberation. Nothing less than a swift promise of a vigorous check on violence in world politics would have satisfied the emotional demands of the time.
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As Mazower notes, some of history is the "product of accident and the inability to foresee outcomes or control events . . ."
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Even though the United Nations was established as a Great Power hegemony, Third World nationalists took its universalist rhetoric at face value, exploited its mechanisms, and fostered international public opposition to continued colonial rule. 113 As the Cold War confrontation between the United
States and the Soviet Union escalated, the smaller nations found that they were able to advance their own interests -often linked to the human rights agenda -in unexpected ways. 114 The General Assembly thus turned "astonishingly quickly" into a forum for anticolonialism, 115 and publicising human rights abuses internationally. 116 person responsible for introducing the phrase "human rights" into the language and politics of the United Nations -also became the first person to be branded by the new world body as a human rights violator.
The most important consequence of the resulting resolution was the opening of the door to a wider international discussion of South Africa"s racial policies. 118 This question became a test case for the United Nations over the next several decades. The restriction of South Africa"s sovereignty through the meta-institution of the United Nations was seen at that time, and should be seen historically, as a great moment of possibility, when older paradigms could be rejected and the world could be fashioned anew. 119 The Charter of the United Nations that emerged from the San Francisco Conference did bear the unmistakable traces of competing Great Power interests. 120 By the same token, however, it did "highlight human rights in an entirely unprecedented fashion," both in the Preamble and the main body of the Charter itself. 121 In this regard the Charter did indeed represent the genesis of practical accomplishments and genuine change during the remaining years of the 20th century.
The inclusion of human rights provisions in the Charter changed the parameters of the debate. It introduced radical new principles into international law and world politics, thereby seeing the world on a path that would be remarkably different from the immediate past.
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In this way the Charter became the primary legal foundation of the international human rights project.
In short, Smuts" lasting contribution did not lay in defining the contents of human rights, but in playing a monumental role in the evolution of human rights from a noble aspiration into binding law.
Smuts may have shaped his time, but he was also shaped by it. The historical moment in which Smuts had introduced the phrase "fundamental human rights" into the Preamble of the Charter of the United Nations was more receptive to the human rights idea than any preceding period in history.
The birth of the United Nations in 1945, combined with the end of the Second World War, the defeat of fascism and Nazism, and the beginning of the terminal decline of overt colonial authority, gave rise to a unique instant in the world"s history, a "global moment"
unparalleled by any other point in time. 123 The confluence of these events enabled what one scholar, in a different context, had termed a "Grotian moment." 124 That is to say, it was a time when old ways of thought and old institutional arrangements were so obviously inadequate -as they had been in Grotius" time -that something different was required.
Smuts crossed more bridges that most in helping to lay the foundations for a world body that would pursue sustainable world peace based on human rights -a notion that Smuts himself barely understood at the time. Therein lies his genius. His monumental shortcoming lies in his inability or unwillingness to chart the same course for his own country regarding the issue of race. This proved to be a bridge too far.
123 See Bhagavan (note 119 above) 311 -312. 124 Jones (note 74 above) 212 -213.
